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ABSTRACT
We develop a quality-adjusted cost index to estimate expected returns to investments in
new technologies. The index addresses the problem of measuring social benefits from innovations
in service sector inputs, where real output is not directly observable. We forecast welfare gains
from two U.S. Advanced Technology Program innovations equaling 25%-50% of expected price,
and aggregate consumer benefits of $1-$2 billion, relative to trends in existing technologies. Our
model’s probabilistic parameters reflect uncertainty about prospective outcomes and in our hedonic
estimates of shadow values for selected product attributes. The index can be readily adopted by
research and development (R&D) managers in industry and government.
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INTRODUCTION
Measuring or forecasting consumer benefits is an important part of any research and
development (R&D) program. In many cases, however, and particularly with high technology,
the innovations are intermediate inputs in the provision of services. Final consumer demand
for services, and thus derived demand for the innovation, depends on service quality, which is
not readily observable and is difficult to measure quantitatively. This complicates efforts to
estimate consumer welfare gains from the innovation.
Bresnahan (1986) solves this problem by developing a cost-of-living index that, under
certain general assumptions, eliminates unobservable quantities from the welfare expression.
The index compares the observed price and performance of an innovated product against a
hypothetical, best-available price and performance had the technical advance not occurred.
Since the prices of other goods and services in consumers’ choice sets cancel out, the index is
a function only of observed and hypothetical technology prices—adjusted for quality
differences—and expenditures as a share of total personal consumption expenditures.
Our approach extends Bresnahan’s methodology in two directions to make it useable
for the important case of the R&D investment decision. Bresnahan retrospectively estimates
consumer welfare gains from innovation. Our first extension is to adapt the cost index to a
prospective setting. This permits the evaluation of expected consumer welfare gains from
proposed R&D projects.1 We allow for the gradual diffusion of the new technology, and we
express the model’s parameters as probability density functions to reflect uncertainties over
future or estimated parameter values. A second extension is to use a hedonic analysis to adjust
                                               
* The authors are, respectively, Fellow, Quality of the Environment Division, Resources for the Future; and
Senior Fellow, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Resources for the Future.
1 This kind of analysis would satisfy, for a federal program, the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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for consumers’ preferences for differentiated product characteristics—which produce benefits
that may not be fully reflected in product prices.
The result is a theoretically grounded economic model of future consumer demand for
a product, embedded within a cost-index simulation model with quality-adjusted prices and
dynamically changing product characteristics. The model produces empirical probability
density estimates of consumers’ welfare gains from the introduction of a new technology and
thus provides a rigorous, transparent approach to forecasting future benefits. The cost-index
model can be used to assemble R&D portfolios from a selection of disparate, competing
projects. Thus it has potential utility to both allocation of private-sector R&D resources and
government R&D procurement.
We illustrate the model by estimating expected consumer welfare gains from a pair of
private-sector innovations in digital data storage (DDS) that have received public support in
the form of R&D grants from the federal Advanced Technology Program (ATP). These new
technologies are expected to offer faster writing and retrieval of digital data, and one would
offer a large increase in storage capacity as well. One innovation would pioneer the use of
optical tape, and the other would replace helical with linear scanning of magnetic tape. Both
technologies promise superior price/performance characteristics compared with existing tape
drives. We estimate how much better off consumers will be than if either new technology is
not introduced.2
Our analysis shows that these first generation technologies, if successfully introduced,
should generate five-year discounted consumer welfare gains of approximately $2.2 billion
(linear scanning) and $1.5 billion (optical tape), relative to the best existing technologies, even
assuming they improve at faster than historical rates. These estimates are medians of
probability distributions; corresponding 5
th-percentile estimates are $1.3B and $1.1B. On a
per-unit basis, these values represent in excess of $2,400 in surplus value for each linear
                                               
2 A long-standing rationale for public subsidies to support private research and development depends on the
expectations that private returns from the innovation will be difficult to appropriate and that consumer benefits
will be sufficiently large. The rationale also depends on a convincing demonstration of a market failure. We do
not address these issues in this paper. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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scanning device sold, and more than $20,800 per optical tape unit. With expected unit prices
of $10,000 and $40,000, respectively, per-unit welfare gains would be considerable.3
We parameterize our model with information on expected new product characteristics,
as provided by the innovators and others familiar with these technologies. The information
includes expectations about likely ranges of price, performance, and rate of adoption. We
estimate consumer shadow values for different product characteristics using recent data on
prices and attributes (e.g., faster file access times) of digital tape data-storage devices. Given
our data sources, we adopt conservative parameter assumptions with respect to the
performance and price of the innovations, their rates of adoption, and the size of the market.
We also base our qualitative conclusions on the model’s 5
th percentile forecasts. We are
conservative to balance out any tendency for the innovators to be overly optimistic.
The cost index is defined relative to an aggressive baseline scenario where we assume
that the best available performance, though in most dimensions lagging that of the would-be
innovations, improves at the same rate after their introduction. We adjust nominal prices for
anticipated quality differences in three key performance attributes of data-storage devices:
capacity, data transfer rate, and file access time. The adjustments reflect our estimates of
consumer valuations for these attributes, based on hedonic analysis of the retail prices of
recent tape data-storage products. The index indicates the relative amount consumers would
be willing to pay for the innovations in a counterfactual, no-ATP-investment world. Applied
to total expenditures on DDS devices, the index estimates consumer welfare gains—net of
purchase price but gross of the R&D subsidy—from the introduction of the new tape drives.
The model’s estimates are surprisingly precise considering its many degrees of
freedom and the dynamically increasing uncertainties of its parameters. Sensitivity analyses,
in which we shift parameter locations, further demonstrate the robustness of the basic
conclusions. Where greater precision is desirable, model simulations can reveal the most
important sources of uncertainty in the final benefit estimates, suggesting where additional
research on the true values of individual parameters might be most cost-effective.
                                               
3 Two caveats in applying this approach to ATP investments are that (1) our findings are not an assessment of
the ATP’s entire portfolio of DDS investments, as several projects failed; and (2) we do not estimate future
consumer benefits that may arise from knowledge spillovers to other innovators. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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1.  A COST-INDEX APPROACH TO WELFARE ESTIMATION
Bresnahan (1986) shows that a Törnqvist cost index (Caves, et al.(1982)), can be used
to measure consumer surplus from innovation. Measuring the gain is straightforward if the
demand curve can be econometrically estimated; however, this is difficult to do in service
sectors, where real output is not readily observed (yet where much of the demand for high
technology is located).4 These considerations make the cost index approach attractive,
because it does not require estimating a demand curve. To paraphrase Bresnahan, the method
substitutes economic theory for (unobservable) data.
The validity of the cost index estimates depends on the assumption that the
downstream (technology-buying) market is competitive. Demand for DDS arises largely from
firms using it as an input to the production of services that require the storage of large
amounts of data (e.g., the insurance, banking, and retail sectors; increasingly, local-area-
networks at business facilities across the economic spectrum also rely on tape-based DDS for
redundant storage). If these downstream markets are competitive, derived demand for DDS
accurately reflects consumer demand, and the cost index will correctly estimate the welfare
gain.5 Although we do not believe downstream market power is a significant issue in our
analysis, ignoring it is consistent with the conservative treatment we also accord the
performance and price data.
Figure 1 illustrates the expected gain in consumer surplus from an outward shift in the
supply curve (as from innovation). Period 0 supply S0
DT is the pre-innovation baseline, where
only a defender technology (DT) is available. The ATP-sponsored innovation occurs at period
1, shifting the supply curve out to S1
ATP (see figure 1, graph on right) due to a combination of
cost reductions and quality improvements. Continuous improvement in the defender
technology means the baseline supply curve has shifted out to S1
DT. The shaded area
                                               
4 Government statistics treat inputs to production as proxies for real outputs in these sectors. Bresnahan (1986)
and Griliches (1979) both point out that it is in service sectors that the benefits from technological advances
(e.g., in computers and related equipment) tend to accrue. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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represents the consumer welfare gain at a point in time, due to the innovation. It is measured
with respect to the hypothetical, future 
DT S1  curve rather than the observed 
DT S0 . As long as
ATP S1  lies to the right of 
DT S1 , the innovation offers an improvement over the defender
technology. In this case the cost index is greater than unity, meaning costs are higher under
































Figure 1. Derived Demand for New Technologies:
Illustration of Net Surplus Change
                                                
5 Following Bresnahan, no assumptions are needed concerning the structure of the DDS-producing market. If
there is market power—or if the DDS innovations create market power—the gain in consumer welfare will be
less than if the upstream market is competitive, and the cost index will be a lower bound on these gains. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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2. MODEL
As Bresnahan points out, assuming the DDS-using markets are competitive allows us to
treat the cost index as an index of consumers’ cost of living and of producing DDS-using
services.6 The index is an estimate of the change in the cost of living (and of producing those
services) under the innovation scenario, relative to the baseline. In our application, the index is
a function of consumer demand for DDS over time, the market’s rate of adoption of the
innovation, and consumer preferences for improvements in DDS performance. Adjustments to
the off-the-shelf prices of the devices reflect these preferences.
Quality Adjustments
These adjustments to nominal unit prices reflect consumer tastes for faster data
transfer rates, larger capacities, and faster file access times. We adjust prices in the following
manner. Let dimx(y) represent technology y’s performance on product dimension x,
y˛{defender technology (DT), Innovation (I)}, and Ddimx represent the difference in
performance between innovation and defender, i.e.,
),(dim)(dimdim DTI xxx -”D
where x˛{Capacity (CAP), Transfer Rate (TR), File Access Time (FAT)}. We estimate
shadow values bx in a hedonic regression,7 adding ( ))dim( xx D￿b  to the price of the
technology that is inferior in dimension x. We assume that consumers prefer higher capacities
and transfer rates and lower file access times. With W
y standing for the quality-adjusted price
of technology y, p
y its expected￿and bracketed terms being indicator variables￿off-the-shelf
(nominal) price, our quality adjustments to the defender DT and the innovation I are:8
                                               
6 Competition in these markets leads to the same level of services production—and demand for DDS—as if
consumers were producing those services themselves, as without market power, production is at consumers’
optimal level. Whence an index of consumers’ cost of living and of producing DDS-using services.
7 See appendix for a description of the hedonic data and analysis.
8 See, for instance, Berndt, et al. (1995). A discussion of quality-adjustment methods employed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in their construction of the consumer price index (CPI) can be found in Moulton & Moses, 1997.
See in particular p. 332 under “direct quality adjustment,” where the method we employ here is described. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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dtdt <D￿D(->D￿)D(+>D￿)D(+= FATFATTRTRCAPCAP FATTRCAP bbb
[ ] [ ] [ ]0)00 p  W
II >D￿D(-<D￿)D(+<D￿)D(+= FATFATTRTRCAPCAP FATTRCAP bbb .
We assume shadow values decline over time,9 reflecting consumers’ declining
marginal utilities: an extra gigabyte of storage capacity is more valuable to consumers the
greater a fraction of their total capacity it represents. Therefore the value of a given increase
in capacity (or other attribute) will decline over time if performance improves over time.
In our application, it is almost always the defender technologies whose prices we
adjust. Their (usually) lower capacities and transfer rates, and longer file access times, impose
real user costs relative to the innovations. The price adjustments equal consumers’ willingness
to pay to achieve the superior performance of the innovations relative to the given baseline.
Cost Index Formula
We construct a Törnqvist cost index to measure the change in the cost of services due
to DDS innovations. The index is the geometric mean of a Laspeyres index—measuring
consumer willingness to accept compensation to give up the gains from the innovation—and a
Paasche index, measuring their willingness to pay to receive gains from innovation. Both are
measured relative to the baseline, and neither is theoretically superior to the other. The
Törnqvist index is an equally weighted average of the two.10
Following Caves et al., we assume that digital data-storage devices are separable from
other consumption in the consumer’s utility function,11 so that the quality-adjusted prices W
in consumers’ expenditure functions can be distinguished from the general prices P of other
goods and services. C
*dt in expression (1) is then the minimum cost of achieving utility u
dt,
which is optimal in the baseline scenario, relative to the cost of u
dt given the ATP innovation.
                                               
9 Time subscripts have been suppressed in this expression.
10 See Varian (1992) for details. As is well known from the theory of index numbers, no single index satisfies
all “desirable” properties or tests (e.g., tests related to scalability, transitivity, symmetry, proportionality). The
Törnqvist index satisfies many of the tests (see Diewert and Nakamura,1993).
11 Marginal rates of substitution are unchanged at different levels of DDS consumption. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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Similarly, C
*I is the cost of achieving optimal utility u
I under the innovation scenario with
baseline prices W























C = . (1)
Because we assume an innovation is adopted gradually, the quality-adjusted DDS prices faced
by post-innovation consumers is not W




dt, where r is the adoption rate of the innovation.12 Prices P of
other commodities can change over time, but we assume that they are unaffected by
innovation in DDS: P
dt=P
I at all times.
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between expenditure functions, utility, and the two
Könus cost indexes. A welfare-enhancing innovation lowers consumers’ costs of achieving a
given level of utility, shifting the expenditure function downward from E*(u,W
dt) to
E*(u,W
A). The vertical distance between the two curves depends on DDS’s share of total
consumption expenditures; their ratio is given by the curve C*. Given a welfare-enhancing
innovation I, the consumer’s optimal utility rises to u*
I>u*
dt. With separable utility and other
prices unaffected, increased utility implies greater consumption of, in our application, DDS.
That, in turn, means that the relative cost to achieve u*
I with higher baseline prices W
dt versus
reduced, post-innovation prices W
A exceeds the relative cost to achieve u*
dt.  Here the Paasche
willingness-to-pay index C*
I exceeds the Laspayres willingness-to-accept measure C*
dt,
which fixes DDS consumption at a lower level.
                                               
12 We suppress time subscripts in this formulation. Here our approach departs from Bresnahan (1986), where



















Figure 2. Relationship between Expenditures, Cost Index 13
We assume, following Caves, et al. (1982), that the consumer expenditure function E
*


























I give, respectively, DDS expenditures as a share of personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) under the baseline and innovation scenarios.15 We forecast values for cost
                                               
13 To simplify figure labeling, prices P have been omitted from the expenditure functions.
14 See Caves, et al. (1982) for derivation. The translog, a flexible functional form, well approximates many
production and expenditure functions.
15 See appendix for description of terms in numerator of expenditure-share parameter. PCE data are from
“Personal Income and Outlays,” Bureau of Economic Analysis. We assume the additional DDS expenditures in David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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index (2) out to 2005, predicting PCE and DDS expenditures on the basis of past data, and
making assumptions about the rate at which DDS prices will change over time. The monetary
value to consumers of the innovation is just the product of their predicted PCE times the
exponent of the cost index.16 This corresponds to the area of the shaded rectangle in figure 1.
Unlike the familiar Consumer Price Index, expression (2) compares prices in a single
period—expected, future prices given the innovation subsidy versus hypothetical future prices
that might otherwise have occurred had there been no subsidy. Because prices and
expenditure shares of non-DDS consumption, and prices of other inputs in the adopting
sectors, are assumed to be unchanged by innovation in DDS, separability assures that these
parameters cancel in expression (2).
Changes in relative DDS prices will affect the mix of inputs used in production.
However, it is not necessary to make any assumptions about input substitutions because the
translog places no restrictions on the elasticities of technical substitution between inputs.17
The translog also does not restrict the income and price elasticities of demand for DDS-using
services. While DDS innovation may affect equilibrium prices for these services, implying
movement along their respective demand curves, translog expenditure functions even permit
arbitrary shifts in those demand curves—say, due to innovation in complements to those
services. As long as consumers’ elasticities of substitution among all goods and services are
unaffected by DDS innovation—and this is an implication of the separable utility
assumption—the translog can accommodate taste-driven changes in demand for DDS, as for
computer technologies generally.18
                                                
the innovation scenario do not affect PCE (as DDS is a tiny fraction of PCE, there would be very little displaced
consumption).
16 Expression (2) actually is the percentage change in consumer surplus from DDS innovation, and takes values near
zero because DDS is a very small portion of the cost of living. To calculate a cost index, (2) must be exponentiated. An
information-processing equipment cost index can also be calculated, using DDS expenditures as a share of
information processing and related equipment expenditures (National Income Product Account tables, U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis).
17 We introduced expenditure functions with respect to consumers. It is appropriate (and necessary) to extend
the discussion to production of information services, because our assumption of a competitive market structure
implies that producer profit maximization coincides with consumer expenditure minimization.
18 These features of translogs are noted in Bresnahan (1986), p. 751. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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The assumption on consumers’ elasticities of substitution is really a restriction on
changes in consumers’ tastes for DDS-using services relative to other consumption. Because
our forecasting window is relatively short, this assumption is not overly restrictive. If demand
elasticities will be affected by DDS innovation, our forecasts for the later years should be
discounted more heavily. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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3. DATA AND ESTIMATION OF SHADOW VALUES
The cost index is a function of estimated total DDS expenditures as a fraction of total
personal consumption expenditures (PCE); off-the-shelf DDS prices; differences in the
technical attributes of the defender technologies and the innovations; marginal consumer
valuations of those differences; quality-adjusted prices reflecting those valuations; and market
conditions of DDS demand and adoption of the innovation. The index also incorporates
expectations about the values of all of these inputs over the relevant time horizon, including
forecasts of PCE.
The cost index itself is simply the ratio of quality-adjusted DDS prices, weighted by
the shares of PCE devoted to DDS in the baseline and innovation scenarios. The price ratio
indicates relative “real” prices of the competing technologies, while the expenditure shares
adjust for levels of demand. A superior new DDS technology might generate a large quality-
adjusted price ratio, but since DDS expenditures are small relative to PCE, consumers’ cost of
living will not be much affected. Per-unit benefits are large, however.
The index is calculated in a simulation model’s containing 18 parameters, all but two
of which are drawn from probability distributions. We directly observe current prices and
performance of the defender technologies, but must forecast even their initial values because
the innovations, as of late 1999, had not yet been introduced.19 The model’s price and
performance forecasts for the new products reflect the innovators’ targets, at introduction and
two to five years ahead. We assume these forecasts reflect some “pioneer project bias”—a
tendency for innovators to be overoptimistic about their projects.20 We make allowances for
this by putting extra weight on “disappointing” outcomes. The affected parameters are
expected growth in market size, adoption rates, prices, and performance of the innovations.
Lognormal density functions have long upper tails and can model this pioneer bias.
Since we have only one or two data points per product, however—from interviews with the
                                               
19 The model’s initial period is keyed to the introduction of a new product. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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innovators—there is no empirical basis for choosing one family of curves over another. We
therefore use triangular functions to model these asymmetries: they are easy to work with
because their tails can be read directly from the specifications of the curves.
In contrast to this conservative treatment of the innovations, we use symmetric
functions to model the distributions of parameters for the existing products. We make our
forecasts of these parameters on the basis of recent trends in leading DDS devices. We assume,
conservatively, that prices of the existing products will decline—and their performances
improve—at the same rate as for the innovations.21
The only parameters for which we have distributional data are the consumer shadow
values. We estimate the shadow values by hedonic regression analysis of recent retail prices
and performance characteristics. These regressions also produce estimated standard errors,
which we insert into the initial-period probability distributions. For the remaining parameters,
we must use ad hoc rules of thumb for the uncertainties. In each period we assume standard
deviations ranging from 5% to 30% of the means, or modes in the case of the triangular
distributions. We assume less uncertainty for the existing-product parameters than for
innovations, even in later years. We reserve the 30% standard deviations for the upper tails of
the asymmetric distributions of the innovations.
The randomness in the model’s parameters has three primary sources: variability in
manufacturing and market conditions, imperfectly observed data, and, most significantly,
uncertainty about future outcomes. As with all of the model’s parameters, we assume that
uncertainty increases over time. While the use of some arbitrary assumptions is unavoidable
given the data, the resulting model is very transparent, and alternative assumptions can easily
                                                
20 See Quirk and Terasawa (1986). A more careful approach to assessing a pioneer-project bias might be based
on how well the innovators satisfied their price/performance targets on earlier products. Such data are not readily
available.
21 These are conservative assumptions because it is likely that easy economies (learning by doing, product
performance improvement) are exploited earliest in a product’s life, and that for the existing technologies many
of these already will have been achieved. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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be explored. Sensitivity tests reveal the extent to which it is necessary to explore alternatives,
and allow us to bound the expected benefits in a meaningful way.22
Because price and performance are functionally equivalent here, we can model the
effect of innovation on consumer welfare either by fixing prices and continually improving
the performance parameters, or by holding performance constant and modeling prices as
continually declining. In our model, it is easier to change one price than it is to manipulate
three performance parameters, so we hold performance fixed and model technological change
by having prices decline over time. To the extent that the actual rate of innovation outpaces
the rate of price decline in our model, our forecasts of consumer welfare gains will be
conservative.
In the appendix (also available from the authors and online at www.rff.org), we report
specific details about our data sources and parameter assumptions.
                                               
22 In addition to making conservative forecasts, our analysis ignores benefits from second-generation products,
and any private benefits accruing to the innovator or to other manufacturers, via knowledge spillovers. Potential
to create knowledge spillovers is one of ATP’s key selection criteria. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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4. RESULTS
We calculate a pair of indexes to compare costs at a single point in time, with and
without the DDS innovations. Since DDS expenditures constitute a tiny fraction of total
consumption expenditures, the indexes are only slightly greater than one. On a per-unit basis,
though, the innovations would both generate significant consumer benefits.23 The
performance specifications for the new technologies are clearly superior to those of existing
products, and their target prices are similar, and welfare gains are the unsurprising result. The
purpose of this analysis has been to estimate their magnitude, and to see how uncertainties
propagate through the model.
In present-value terms, we find that median consumer welfare gains over five years
would be $2.2 billion from the digital, linear scanning (DLS) technology, and $1.5 billion for
optical tape, discounting at a 5% annual rate. Compared with current DDS trends, the
innovations would create approximately $2,400 in additional consumer welfare per DLS
device sold—about 23% of the expected unit price—and $20,800 per optical tape device—
about 50% of the unit price.24 These relative gains reflect marked downward trends in
consumer shadow values and steadily declining prices for all DDS devices.
Initial per-unit gains should be higher still, but total welfare gains will be lower
initially due to minimal early market penetration. By the 5
th year, we assume rates of adoption
for DLS and optical tape devices will reach 40% and 30% of new medium- and high-capacity
unit sales, respectively. Knowledge spillovers and follow-on improvements may eventually
affect every sale. Although we explicitly estimate only the gains from first-generation
products, such ancillary benefits are implicitly captured in the results. Our assumptions about
adoption rates are not intended to reflect knowledge spillovers; if they occur, our benefit
                                               
23 Our estimates are gross of R&D costs; benefits are likely to dominate those costs, however. Note that our
estimates also depend on the assumption that the prices of other goods and services in consumers’ market basket
are unaffected by DDS innovation. This seems innocuous because digital data storage constitutes a very small
part of the economy.
24 The model forecasts that mean unit sales in QIV-2004 will be approximately 133,790 linear scanning devices,
and 10,670 optical tape units. Innovators of the linear-scanning technology reported cost and price expectations;
based on this, their producer surplus in the 5
th year would be approximately 30% of expected price. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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estimates may be low. If, on the other hand, disk drive arrays continue to make inroads into
traditional tape storage markets, actual benefits will be lower than expected. The uncertainty
in our estimates implicitly allows for these possibilities, provided our assumptions about
market shares and changes in price—our model’s equivalent, recall, of technological
improvements—are accurate.
Table 1, and figures 3 and 4, report our basic set of benefits estimates. As our
sensitivity analysis will show, these results are robust to large changes in assumptions. Even
with generous allowances for uncertainty and biases in our data, 5
th percentile benefits are
driven to zero only by large changes in specific parameter assumptions. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
17
TABLE 1: EXPECTED NET PRESENT VALUE OF CONSUMER WELFARE















($ billions, 2000; N=1000 iterations)
Figures 3 and 4 show how gains are expected to accumulate over time. The shapes of
these curves are determined principally by our assumptions about rates of adoption, growth in
demand for DDS devices, and changes in price. Our five-year forecasting window is a
compromise between forecasting ahead indefinitely—as if the ATP would be putting  DDS
technology on a permanently higher plane—and making no forecast at all, as if the
innovations would have been achieved on schedule even without assistance. As with other
assumptions in our model, the truth must lie somewhere in between. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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Figure 3. Expected Quarterly Consumer Benefit Given Successful Introduction:
Digital, Linear Scanning Innovation vs. Defending Products
Quarter
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Figure 4. Expected Quarterly Consumer Benefit: Optical Tape Innovation
versus. Defending Products
Quarter











We perform three types of sensitivity analysis. First, we ask how sensitive our results
are to parameters whose values are informed by the innovators. We shift by +/-50% our
assumptions about performance, rates of adoption, and price, while making proportional
changes in uncertainties. Second, we consider the effects of parameters affecting both
defender and innovation. Here, we focus on shadow values and market size. It is important to
test shadow value sensitivities, because in the model we are applying estimates of marginal
valuations to large changes in quality. Finally, aside from parameters that affect the level of
benefits, we also identify the drivers of uncertainty in the forecasts. We ask which parameter
uncertainties are most highly correlated with variation in benefits.
As we show in the appendix, benefits estimates are relatively insensitive to the
performance parameters; price and rate of adoption are more influential, particularly the latter.
The elasticity of benefits with respect to the adoption rate is slightly greater than one. Raising David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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the prices of the innovations—and lowering their rates of adoption and change in price—by
50% reduces forecasted benefits by fully 80%. However, such large changes are well outside
the expected range for these parameters, especially for the two price parameters. In particular,
innovation prices should drop faster, not more slowly, than the defender prices.
The market-condition parameters, including consumer preferences, affect both
innovation and defender alike. We find that the shadow values are not very influential, in part
because innovation price uncertainty swamps the effects of variation in the shadow values.
For the same reason, total benefits are not very sensitive to the technological performance
parameters of the devices. For the current model configuration, then, applying marginal
shadow valuations to large changes in performance does not pose problems. Among the
market-condition parameters, the key is market size. The elasticity of benefits is roughly unity
with respect to this parameter, because it factors out of the cost index and acts as a scaling
factor. The market growth parameter contributes much less to benefits; if both the market size
and market growth assumptions were lowered by 50%, forecasted innovation benefits to
consumers would decrease by 54%.
Uncertainty in these two market parameters is the most highly correlated with
uncertainty in the benefits forecast of any other parameter. Thus, the most efficient way to
reduce uncertainty in the forecast is to acquire more precise data on market size and past
growth rates. Obviously, though, market growth forecasts resulting from the new data may
prove no more accurate than what is already in the model.
In the context of our model, the size of the market for DDS storage on tape and the
adoption rates of the innovations are therefore the most important scaling factors for estimated
consumer benefits.25 Lowering both parameters simultaneously by 50% reduces estimated
benefits by 75-77%. To drive 5
th-percentile benefits to zero, parameters affecting the relative
benefits of the innovations must be changed. For instance, shadow values must be reduced 85-
90%, or innovation prices must be fixed at introductory levels while defender prices drop as
originally assumed (linear-scanning), or twice as fast as assumed (optical tape).
                                               
25 Of course, these market parameters are partially endogenous to the performance characteristics of the
innovations, though we do not model that process. Recall that neither of the market parameters affects the sign of
the benefits estimates, which are driven solely by the relative performances and prices of the innovations. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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Details of our approach are in the Appendix.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis has shown that consumer welfare gains from ATP investments in digital
data storage are likely to be substantial. Median expected benefits of innovation, given
successful completion of these projects, are equivalent to approximately 23% of the target
price of the digital, linear-scanning device, and 50% of the price for the optical tape drive. We
compare the anticipated innovations to a counterfactual scenario that assumes current
technological trajectories continue as before. The estimated welfare gains are relative to
consumer surplus already produced by those baseline tape-drive technologies; with the
innovations, total consumer surplus, which we do not estimate, would be the sum of existing
and incremental benefits. If the new technologies achieve expected sales, the total, median
consumer welfare gains from these innovations will be several billion dollars each.
The ATP explicitly assumes that, without their support, these innovations would not
be currently pursued. By design, the “generic” technologies ATP seeks to support are too
technically risky to attract private capital, and insufficiently appropriable because they
promise to create significant knowledge spillovers for other, future innovators. To attribute
the welfare gains estimated in this paper to ATP investments, it is necessary to assume that
these ATP investments correct a market failure, or that their screening criteria do apply to
these innovations.
The consumer welfare gains are not, by themselves, sufficient argument for public
subsidies to private R&D. A full assessment of the ATP’s DDS investments, for instance,
would also consider other, failed DDS investments the ATP has made, as well as the
opportunity costs of all of these investments. Just one success on the scale of the two forecast
in this paper would far outweigh the ATP’s total annual investments in all areas of
technology, however. With a few documented successes, the case for the ATP could come
down to whether they are correcting market failures in R&D. Consideration of these issues is,
of course, beyond the scope of this project. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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The “total” welfare gains we estimate of course depend on the choice of the
appropriate simulation window. We chose five years to match the innovators’ apparent time
horizons. Our results, as illustrated in figures 3 and 4, suggest that the incremental benefits
from ATP’s investments would continue to grow beyond five years. This begs the issue of
whether the ATP has put the DDS trajectory on a permanently higher plane, or merely sped
up developments that would have occurred eventually. We do not address that issue, though
we clearly assume that the new DDS technologies would not have been developed within five
years without ATP assistance. Accommodating a differing view would simply mean
shortening the window to some other agreed-upon length.
The results are clearly no stronger than the assumptions underlying the model. The
probabilistic parameters allow for unforeseen technological developments, however, and one
of the model’s strengths is that it incorporates all relevant information and varies all of the
parameters simultaneously. The implications of changes to any subset of parameter
assumptions can be explored within a unified framework. As a result, we have been able to
show that significant welfare gains from two highlighted investments in DDS technologies are
very likely, and that this qualitative conclusion is robust to very large changes in the
assumptions of the model. Finally, while our paper discusses the intricacies of the model in its
application to one new technology, we think this cost-index approach is a straightforward and
potentially useful resource allocation tool for R&D managers in both the private and public
sectors. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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APPENDIX
Data
Our data on the innovations—and on the identities of the technologies they consider their
future competition—come from structured interviews we conducted in the spring of 1998 with
the leaders of the innovating teams.26 The interviews concerned specific details about the
proposed technologies and the market conditions they are expected to face. Having examined the
innovators’ funding proposals, we asked respondents to compare their actual progress to date
against the project’s original goals. We sought information not only on current projected transfer
rates, capacities, and access times, but also about advances in competing technologies.27 In
addition to items relating to price and performance, we also elicited their forecasts of market
conditions, particularly the expected rate of adoption of their innovation, and the size of the
market.28 Using the innovators’ responses about the identities, price, and performance of
competing products, we collected precise data directly from the manufacturers of those products
for use in the simulation model. Finally, we subjected our fully specified model to a careful
review by several engineers familiar with data storage theory and practice.29
As table A-1 indicates, the interviews elicit beliefs about “most likely” outcomes
(assuming successful innovation). The latter responses inform some of the parameter
uncertainties in our model, in ways we make precise below. Although there are in principle
three sources of uncertainty that can affect the parameters of the model—variability in
                                               
26 Our access to project leaders and their information was gained through the assistance of the Advanced
Technology Program. The ATP’s interest in our research was that, while the R&D it sponsors may yield large
benefits in future, the program must report annually to Congress as stipulated by the Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA). The forecasts produced by the model we present here are one kind of information the ATP
may wish to report in fulfillment of the GPRA.
27 Although we asked about other performance characteristics, the interview subjects were unanimous in
identifying capacity, transfer rate, and access time as the relevant dimensions.
28 The DDS market is apparently segmented according to capacity. We divide the market into expensive, high-
capacity drives and more affordable, low-capacity drives. The two matches we have assigned to the optical
innovation come from the former segment, and for the digital-linear scanning technology from the latter
segment.
29 The outside reviewers are both employees of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which is the
ATP’s home institution. The reviewers suggested a number of changes in our assumptions, which we
implemented. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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manufacturing and market conditions, imperfectly observed data, uncertainty about future
outcomes—the third source must dominate. We assume uncertainty increases over time.
Shadow Values
Compared with existing products, the DDS innovations promise improved performance
at comparable prices. If they are successfully introduced, it is thus very likely the innovations
will enhance consumer welfare, making the interesting question not whether, but by how much
welfare would increase. We measure this by estimating consumers’ willingness to pay for
improvements in the data transfer rate, storage capacity, and file access time of a tape-based
data-storage device.
We compare new and existing devices on the basis of differences in their performance
attributes. We translate these differences into monetary terms using our willingness-to-pay
estimates, and adjust the list prices of the machines accordingly. These quality-adjusted prices
reflect relative differences in the values consumers will realize from the devices. As we
explain below, we make upward adjustments to the prices of inferior technologies, reflecting




1. What are the most important technical innovations (attributes or characteristics) of your project?
2. According to ATP documents, at the start of your project, your goals were to achieve [X, Y, Z among the key
characteristics]. Can you confirm or update these capabilities?
i.  Optical tape: 100 megabytes per second; 1 terabyte capacity; 8 meters/sec tape speed
ii.  Digital linear scanning:
3. At the start of your project, the best available technologies were capable of:
i. File access time: 44 secs. Your project was initially expected to achieve XX secs, a YY% gain in average access
time over the then current best available technology (BAT). Is this information still correct? What is now the best
currently available file access time?
ii. Storage capacity: 35 gigabytes. Your project was expected to achieve XX gigabytes, a YY% gain in capacity over
the current BAT. Is this still correct? What is now the best currently available capacity?
iii. Data transfer rate: 0.21 MB/sec. Your project was expected to achieve XX MB/sec, a YY% improvement over
the then-current BAT. Is this still correct? What is now the best currently available transfer rate?
4. Has the pace of your own R&D achievements been as expected in these dimensions? In other dimensions?
5. Have R&D developments among your competitors been as expected? (list specific dimensions of product performance)
6. Have we failed to ask you about any important dimensions of your new product’s performance? What units are they
measured in, and what improvements do they promise with respect to the BAT?
II. MARKET
1. What is the innovation’s primary market, or markets?
2. What is the expected size of this market, in terms of units shipped?
3. When do you expect to reach market?
4. What is your expected adoption rate over 2-5 years (with uncertainty bounds)?
5. At what price do you expect to sell the product embodying the new technology?
6. How do you expect this price to trend over the first two years? Five years? (as driven by continued R&D or learning-
by-doing, as well as anticipated market dynamics.)
7. What are your most important market-related hurdles?
• Is it critical to be first to market?
• How likely is it that improvements in the defender technology would render yours uncompetitive?
• Does the success of your innovation depend on new applications arising for digital data storage?
• Will it be necessary for users to adopt complementary technologies to take advantage of yours?
8. What is the “off-the-shelf” price of the defender technology? [This item probes respondent’s familiarity with or
identification of its competitors. The model uses  manufacturer data]
9. What rates of change in defender price and performance do you expect over the next 2 years, 5 years?
10. Do you expect the defender to compete on price with your innovation?
11. What is the going market price for a unit of capacity (per MB), access time (per second), transfer rate (KB per
second)? [This item sought innovator opinion on shadow values; especially for the latter two. The typical responses
were sharply at odds with market data; with our hedonic analysis; and with opinions from disinterested experts. We
concluded that the innovators do not have a clear idea of how much consumer surplus they may generate; as our results
suggest, their pricing will not extract much of the consumer surplus their innovations will create.]
12. Do you expect your innovation will drastically change any of these [shadow prices]?
13. Have we omitted any important market issues? David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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We estimate consumers’ marginal valuations of DDS quality changes using a hedonic
regression model of DDS drive attributes. We estimate a simple, linear model to explain
variation in DDS retail prices, using product attributes and other control variables as
independent variables. The data for this procedure come from current manufacturers’ web
sites, and from “Dirt Cheap Drives” advertisements in issues of Computer Shopper30 dating
from 1994 to 1998.
The model we estimate is:
p
t=a+b1(data rate)+b2(access time)+b3(capacity)+b4(time)
+ squared terms + interactions + dummies + e,
where the intercept term a and the coefficients bx are parameters to be estimated, and e is a
mean-zero, normally distributed error term. The fitted coefficients  x b ˆ  are estimates of
consumers’ shadow values, the amount they are willing to pay for marginal changes in the
corresponding attributes. Data rate is measured in megabytes/sec, capacity in gigabytes,
access time in seconds,31 and time in quarters since QI-1994. We use indicator variables to
control for the identities of the leading manufacturers; whether the tape medium is 4mm (the
size of DAT cassettes); whether the product is a (multi-drive) library system; and whether it is
an internal drive. We interact the quality attributes with the time variable to estimate how
consumers’ marginal utilities change over time. Finally, we include squared terms to capture
non-linear aspects of consumer valuations.
Our results contain no big surprises. The signs of the coefficients on the quality terms
are positive, meaning consumers are willing to pay more for better performance.32 The
interaction terms indicate that the marginal utility of additional quality declines over time—as
a result, no doubt, of the rising level of quality in DDS devices that is captured in the data.
The value of an extra gigabyte of storage is greater when average device capacity is closer to
                                               
30 Ziff-Davis
31 The average time required to queue up a file on a tape is measured by a device’s spool speed multiplied by
half the length of the tape.
32 There is one exception: the coefficient on Access Time is negative, obviously for the same reason. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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1 GB than when it is 100GB.33 The squared terms, which allow for curvature in the rates of
decline, are small and not statistically significant.
Table A-1 reports our estimates of the initial shadow values in the simulation model.
These have dropped considerably over time—our regression equation estimates they were 2-3
times higher in 1995 than they will be in 2000. As might be expected, the current cost of a
gigabyte of storage on disk, about $100 in 1999, is higher than our estimated shadow value of
tape storage capacity, though the cost of disk storage is dropping by up to 40% per year.34
Our estimate’s relative similarity to this value is reassuring; as with our other assumptions,
however, we check the sensitivity of our results to changes of +/-50% in the shadow values.
Table A-2: Shadow Value Forecasts35
Attribute
Shadow Value (std. dev.)
Estimate: 2000 Forecast: 2005
Data Transfer Rate $791  /MB/sec ($208) $433  /MB/sec
Storage Capacity $39  /GB ($9.88) $13  /GB
File Access Time36 $49  /sec ($12.25) $40  /sec
These values should apply only to marginal improvements in quality. As the
innovations may introduce quite large changes, these initial shadow values may overestimate
the resulting welfare gains. In our model, however, the shadow values decline over time and,
as sales of the innovations increase over time, most of the large quality differences that are
expected will be valued at significantly lower levels than suggested by the figures in table A-
2. By the last period of the simulation, we estimate that the shadow values for the attributes
will have declined by 50%, 75%, and 20%, respectively, as we describe.
                                               
33 As a possible exception, the marginal utility of faster file access times may increase over some range, as that
second saved on the margin represents an increasing fraction of total remaining access time.
34 Kent Rochford, NIST, personal communication.
35 Our interview subjects suggested marginal valuations that are sharply at odds with our estimates. These
included $5,000/MB/second for data rate, $4,300/GB of capacity, and $1,000/second file access time. While
these guesses appear quite optimistic, given their price targets the manufacturers clearly have no intention of
extracting this supposed consumer surplus. The third guess is somewhat more plausible, as we will discuss.
36 Estimated shadow value of reduction in access time, the outcome of a heuristic process. Hedonic methods did
not work well for this attribute, as we explain below. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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The data do not yet support the derivation of a statistically significant shadow value
estimate for file access time in a hedonic regression. Until only very recently, slow file access
times have not been considered a significant constraint on the utility of DDS drives. As a
result, shadow values for differences in file access times have apparently been small. The
relative past unimportance of access times may be because DDS storage capacities and
transfer rates have only recently reached levels at which file access times are a significant
bottleneck in DDS performance. Larger capacities are probably correlated with slower access
times, and with transfer rates increasing, the slower access may have only recently become a
nuisance. The position of data-storage experts is that, whereas capacity and transfer rate have
each been, in turn, the most significant performance bottleneck for DDS performance, access
times are now the most important constraints—particularly as new, data-intensive applications
continue to develop and the demand for new forms of storage—for instance in “near-line”










































Figure A-1: Technological Constraints in Digital Data Storage38
                                               
37 See “Tape Opportunities for the ‘90s and Beyond”, Michael Peterson, Strategic Research Corporation;
February, 1997. Large arrays of hard drives can successfully compete with tape for some applications, and offer
extremely fast file access times. However, we believe a consistent market for tapes exists where a permanent,
portable record is required—as with archival functions—and file access times are expected to become an
important limiting factor in the utility of those systems.
38 Figure taken from “Tape Opportunities for the ‘90s and Beyond,” op. cit. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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To estimate the shadow value of file access time, we perform a simple calculation
based on heuristic arguments that depend on conservative assumptions about a machine’s
average service life, intensity of usage, and the average value of users’ time on the job. We
then calculate what a consuming firm should be willing to pay for each second of file access
time saved per file request relative to the slower technology. This value is given by:
(file requests/day)*(service days/year)*(years of service life)*(value of worker time/second)
We assume a DDS device will receive read/write requests 235 days per year, the
equivalent of 47 work weeks per year, and will have a useful service life of five years. We
estimate the value of worker time at $15 per hour, the approximate national hourly wage in
2000.39 Finally, we assume the device will receive 10 read/write requests per working day.
The first two assumptions are intended to be a little conservative; for white-collar
professionals, who are the typical users of DDS, $15 may be a very conservative estimate of
the value of their time, unless they are productive at other tasks while they wait for a file. Our
assumption about the number of file requests is arbitrary; table A-3 shows the shadow values
that would be implied by other levels of usage. In the model we assume 10 requests because it
is on the low side of what we believe are reasonable levels of usage to expect in the face of
data-storage demands sufficient to induce the purchase of a DDS device. We conservatively
assume that average usage of a device does not grow over time.
At 10 file transfers per day, an average DDS purchaser would be willing to pay an
extra $49 for each second of reduction in file access time. If one device queues up a file an
average of 30 seconds faster than another device, the additional value would be $1,470
(=30•$49) over the life of the machine.
                                               
39 This figure is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate for 1999. The 2000 estimate will be somewhat
higher, another reason to believe ours is a conservative estimate. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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Table A-3:  File Access Shadow Values
by Expected Intensity of Use
Anticipated
Daily Requests
Shadow Value of 1 second





Rates of Change in Consumer Valuations
The time-interaction terms in the hedonic analysis yield linear estimates of the rates of
change in capacity and transfer rate shadow values as 5.6% and 3.0%, respectively, per
quarter. As we explain below, we also assume access-time shadow values will decline at a 1%
rate. As we have noted, it is necessary to assume the rates decline exponentially, to avoid
forecasting negative shadow values by 2005. We assume these shadow values decline
according to:
( ) t r
x t x
x e
￿ ￿ = 0 , , b b ,
where bx,0 is the estimated shadow value for quality attribute x in the initial period, rx is the
estimated coefficient of interaction term (x*t) in the hedonic regression, and t is time in
quarters, from (QI,2000) to (QI,2005). These functions yield rates of decline that appear
nearly linear in the initial years, and that begin to level out toward 2004.
As with the shadow values themselves, the hedonic regression does not usefully
estimate a rate of decline for access-time shadow values. If access time is increasingly to
become a bottleneck for DDS, as industry experts believe, shadow values should initially
increase. We conservatively assume they will not increase, but will decline at a slower rate
than for the shadow values of capacity and transfer rate.
The simulation model’s probability distributions for shadow values and their rates of
decrease are tabulated in the appendix. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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PARAMETER ASSUMPTIONS
For expositional simplicity, rather than compare the new technologies against each of
several leading, existing products, we instead average the characteristics of the two strongest
defending technologies (constituting, in both the high- and medium-capacity segments of the
DDS market, significant fractions of total sales) and compare the new technologies against
these “virtual” defenders. We calculate weighted averages of the prices and performance of
each pair of defenders, using as weights each defender’s estimated share of the total unit sales
between them, immediately prior to the expected introduction of the innovations. Simulations
based on individual product comparisons produce qualitatively similar results.
We compare the digital-linear scanning technology against the Sony GY2120 and the
Quantum DLT 7000 tape drives, both of which employ conventional helical scanning
technology. In the market for these medium-capacity tape storage units, the DLT 7000 is the
most popular drive by a fairly wide margin, though the GY2120 currently commands a
significant share of that market as well.
The optical tape technology is compared against the Ampex DST 412 and IBM 3590
high-capacity storage units, both of which employ conventional, magnetic tape technology.
The Ampex is truly a niche product, albeit one with an enormous storage capacity. The IBM
drive is by far the most popular in the high-capacity segment of the tape-storage market, and in
what follows, the “optical defenders” distributions are therefore quite similar to those for the
3590 drive alone.40
The following parameters are discussed here:
• Off-the-shelf (nominal) prices
• Quarterly rates of change in nominal prices
• Quality differences (data transfer rates, storage capacities, file access times)
• Market sizes
• Adoption rates
• Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE)
• Shadow values and rates of decline
                                               
40 Quantum markets a high-capacity unit based on the DLT7000 drive, the PowerStor L500. However, this unit
simply adds robotics and tape cartridges to the basic drive. We exclude that product on the grounds that the








Triangular (9,10,12) Two respondents agree: $10k price target. No price range
offered. We assume (–10%,+20%) dispersion
Virtual Defender
(helical scanning)
Normal (6.9, 0.2) Quantum ($5.7k), Sony ($31k). Prices as of Autumn 1998. We
assume prices fall over time (see later table). By May ’99,
Quantum’s price was $4.8k, but this is similar to our model’s
projection for that time.  We assume 2.5% std. deviation
Optical Tape
Innovation
Tri (38,40,48) Two respondents differ, one offering range of $40-45k for
target price. Thus assume (-5%,+20%) dispersion
Virtual Defender
(magnetic tape)
N(63.3, 1.6) IBM ($47.3k), Ampex ($115k), 2.5% std. deviation.
IBM price includes 10 1Gb tape cartridges @ $80each.
These assumptions yield the empirical densities depicted in figure A-2.
       Off-the-shelf price ($ year 2000)









Figure A-2: Nominal Price Distributions for Defender Technologies and Innovations
Quarterly Rate of Change in Nominal Prices
We assume that nominal prices decay exponentially according to 
t
t e p p
r ￿ = 0 , where
0 p  is the initial off-the-shelf price and r is the rate of decline per quarter t. For each
innovation, we solve for the rate r such that the expected price for the 20
th quarter equals the David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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innovator’s year-5 forecast. For all of these products, the resulting r becomes the mode of a
triangular distribution, with bounds determined as noted below. We conservatively assume the
defender prices will drop as quickly as for the innovators, though the defender should already
have exploited the more accessible learning-by-doing and scale economies. We implicitly






Tri (-0.06,-0.0578,-0.018) Innovators expect initial price of $10k, $5k after two years.
Upper tail of this distribution is consistent with price of $7k
after five years. Lower tail gives nominally faster decline.
Virtual Defender
(helical scanning)
Tri (-0.06,-0.0578,-0.018) Matches paired innovation.
Optical Tape
Innovation
Tri (-0.03,-0.024,-0.014) Innovators expect initial price of $40k, $25k by year 5. Upper
tail yields $30k by year 5, lower tail a nominally lower $22k.
Virtual Defender
(magnetic tape)
Tri (-0.03,-0.024,-0.014) Matches paired innovation. One respondent explicitly expects
IBM 3590 price to keep pace with optical tape price.
Figure A-3 illustrates our assumptions about rates of price decline r. We assume a
much wider and more skewed distribution for the digital linear-scanning device to
accommodate both its proponents expectation of faster decreases in price than for the optical
tape drive, and our conservative assumption that its price may decline no faster than for the
other technology. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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Figure A-3: Rates of Exponential Price Decay
We introduce a modest error into the price forecast, so that uncertainty grows over
time. The error is normally distributed with mean zero, standard deviation 0.015, meaning that
half of the density lies between -1.0% and +1.0%, and nine-tenths of the density lies between
-2.46% and +2.46%. Prices are perturbed according to Perr(t)=P(t)*(1+perturbation*t), where t
is time in quarters.
Quality Differences







Tri(18, 25, 30) Mode of 25 MB/sec comes from interview responses of “20-
30 MB/sec”; lower bound reduced additional 10% to be
conservative. Though we hold quality fixed (changing price
only), innovators reported expectation of faster rates by 2000.
Virtual Defender
(helical scanning)
N(5.8, 0.145) 2.5% standard deviations. Wgtd mkt average transfer rate.
Optical Tape
Innovation




N(14.3, 0.3575) 2.5% standard deviations, Wgtd mkt average transfer rate.
Best current transfer rate is 15 MB/sec (Ampex DST312)
These assumptions yield the density functions in figure A-4 for the simulation model: David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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    Current data rate (MB/sec)








Figure A-4: Current Transfer Rate: Innovations and Defender Technologies






Tri(14.7,16,16.66) Respondents confident of achieving 16 GB. Uncertainty arises
because product does not yet exist. Asymmetric distribution
has upper and lower bounds simulating, respectively, 5
th
percentile of a N(16,8) and 95
th percentile of a N(16,4) dist’n.
Virtual Defender
(helical scanning)
N(36, 0.90) Mean reflects figures reported in current product literature.
Std. Deviation is 2.5% of mean.
Optical Tape
Innovation
Tri(918,1000,1041) Respondents confident of 1000 GB target. Bounds set as
above, using 5
th percentile of N(1000,50) for lower bound,
95
th of N(1000,25) for upper.
Virtual Defender
(magnetic tape)
N(233.5, 5.84) Mean reflects figures reported in current product literature.
Std. Deviation is 2.5% of mean.
The implications of these assumptions are depicted in figure A-5. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
A-14
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Figure A-5:  Storage Capacities: Innovations and Defender Technologies
File access time is the time required to spool to the beginning of the average file,
measured as spool speed times half the length of the tape. Although tape length might easily
be adjustable, the innovators have indicated the length they intend choosing as their standard.
Drive Access Time (seconds) Notes
Digital, Linear
Scanning Innovation
Tri (7.2, 7.5, 10) Respondents indicated 10-second access time as of 1997,
expecting 7.5 by 2000. Lower bound analogous to optical
lower bound (below); upper assumes no progress after 1997.
Virtual Defender
(helical scanning)
N(61.2, 1.53) Mean reflects figures reported in current product literature.
Standard deviation assumed to be 2.5% of mean.
Optical Tape
Innovation
Tri (11.5, 12, 13.25) Respondents indicated “20 sec” and “20-25 sec” spool time.
We assume 24 seconds +2.5 / -1.0; access time is half this.
Virtual Defender
(magnetic tape)
N(38.6, 0.965) Mean reflects figures reported in current product literature.
Ampex offers access time comparable to innovation’s.
IBM’s plans to introduce longer tape some time in 1999 are
not reflected here. 2.5% std. deviation assumed.
Figures A-6 illustrates these assumptions. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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       Current File Access Time (seconds)









Figure A-6: File Access Times for Innovators and Defenders
Market Size




Uniform (198.05, 267.95) Interview subjects supplied the following information:
About 150,000 DLT 7000 drives sold in 1997 @ $5650.
About 400,000 units were said to ship in $3500 range.
As described below, we predict year-2000 sales of approx.
27,000 units of Sony GY2120 @$31,000,
206,000 units of DLT 7000. Total is
233,000, medium-capacity segment, year 2000.




Uniform (20.71, 28.03) Interview subjects supplied the following information:
About 35,000 IBM 3590 drives shipped per year.
A second opinion was “20,000+” units.
Our model (described below) predicts sales of approx.
18,600 units of IBM 3590 @ $42,500,
5,700 units of Ampex DST 412 @ $115,000. Total is
24,300, hi-capacity segment, yr 2000. 15% bounds assumed.
We intend these estimates to be somewhat conservative. We ignore smaller
manufacturers, though because we believe that the defender technologies have substantial
shares of their market segments, our data probably represent a large fraction of total sales.
We derive our admittedly crude estimates by fitting a straight line through the price/quantity David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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pairs (in logarithms) expressed in the interviews. This method yields a linear inverse-
demand curve of log(Q)=22.5-1.2*log(P), which seems to fit the data quite well (R
2 = 0.93).
We use this formula as the basis for predicting quantities sold in 2000 as a function of
expected price. The ratio of the standard error to the coefficient of the log(P) term is about
1/6 in this regression. This provides our rationale—albeit not a strong one—for choosing
15% bounds on the market size parameters.
Future DDS demand may be affected by the innovations’ potential stimulation of the
development of new, storage-intensive services such as in medical imaging or virtual real-
estate marketing applications. However, there is a countervailing risk that some of this
demand growth will be satisfied by large hard-drive arrays or other competing technologies,
as some expect their prices and performance may eventually overshadow current
developments in tape technologies.41 We have attempted to model neither possibility, about
which we are agnostic. We note that our model can easily accommodate a wide variety of
assumptions about market size or any other parameter.





(no subsidy for DDS
innovation)







N (1.8%, 0.540) Exponential growth assumed:
Mkt-Size(t)=Mkt-Size(t-1)*Exp(t*Growth Rate)
See text.
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis expects growth in “information services and
products, less telephonics” to be linear at a rate of 1.5% per quarter.42 As we expect growth in
                                               
41 Kent Rochford, NIST. Personal communication.
42 National Income and Product Accounts tables. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce.
Recent purchases of “Computers and Peripheral Equipment” have grown at approximately 2.5% per quarter
(Survey of Current Business NIPA table 5.8 (August, 1998) for years 1994-1997). This series may be less
relevant to forecasting demand in DDS, which we believe is closely associated with the demand for information
services. It is also consistent with our overall approach to use the smaller, information services forecast. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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the demand for medium- and high-capacity DDS drives more or less to keep pace with growth
in information services, we use the BEA’s forecast as the mean growth level in our baseline
(no innovation) simulation scenario. We assume growth is normally distributed with standard
deviation equal to 15% of the mean.
If either innovation is successful, we assume it will stimulate additional demand
beyond the BEA’s linear forecast. To reflect our expectation that demand growth may be
slightly faster with public-sector subsidies, for the innovation scenario we assume that growth
will be exponential with a quarterly rate of 1.8% and standard deviation equal to 30% of this
amount, normally distributed.
Initially, the average innovation-scenario prediction is similar to the baseline market
size forecast; after about the 8
th quarter, however, the two predictions begin to diverge
significantly, until in the 20
th quarter the innovation scenario predicts 10% greater sales on
average than in the baseline scenario.
In the upper tails of the growth-rate probability densities, the innovation scenario
yields significantly faster growth rates. In the innovation scenario, the 95
th-percentile growth
rate is 2.7%, which still lags our interviewees’ much more optimistic expectations. One
respondent expects sales of the IBM 3590 to increase roughly threefold by 2005, which
implies a quarterly exponential growth rate of 3.3%. The same person expects total installed
capacity to increase from 80 petabytes in 1997 to 500 PB in 2001, an 11.5% quarterly growth
rate. We address these expectations in our sensitivity analysis.
Adoption Rates
Innovation Adoption Rate Notes
Digital, Linear Scanning l=0.035, g=2.2 Lambda and gamma assumed constant.
See text for interpretation.
Optical l=0.03, g=2.2 Lambda and gamma assumed constant.
We assume that the innovation will partially displace sales of defender technologies and
partially expand the market. In the model, innovation market shares increase monotonically with
time according to the following Weibull process: David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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F(t) = 1—exp( -lt
g)
Here t is time in quarters, l is a scale parameter, 0<l<1, having the interpretation of a
hazard rate (which is therefore assumed to be constant), and g>0 is a shape parameter. It is
difficult to associate l and g directly with specific curve shapes; experimentation was
necessary to achieve the desired curves. We chose Weibull curves that reflect the lower range
of our respondents’ expectations about their future market shares.43  Figure A-7 shows a detail
of the Weibull functions showing our assumed market shares over time for the two innovations,


























Linear Scan: lambda=.035, gamma=2.2
Optical: lambda=.03, gamma=2.2
Figure A-7:  Weibull Adoption Rate Curves: Percent of Current Sales
  (Detail: first five years)
Future Private Consumption Expenditures
Data on U.S. personal consumption expenditures (PCE) are available from the
National Income Product Account tables produced by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
                                               
43 Lambda affects the curvature of the function, with larger values implying faster adoption rates. As gamma
increases, the curve’s inflection points are “delayed.” The Weibull curves are quite sensitive to l and g ,
requiring us to treat them as predetermined constants in our simulation model.
44 The complete graphs show S-shaped, cumulative distribution functions that cross 90% at about 10 and 12
years, respectively. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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PCE serves as the denominator of the factor share calculations in the cost index, as well as the
factor by which the index is multiplied to produce the model’s estimate of benefits net of
baseline.
The model requires a forecast of PCE out to 2005. We build our forecast by regressing
annual PCE against time for the years 1982 through 1998. With time expressed in quarters
since I-1982, the resulting equation is PCE=449,228-227.7*(qtr), and the model fits the data
very well (R
2=0.997). We assume future expenditures are normally distributed with means
equal to the predictions of this expression, and initial standard deviation equal to 2.759% of
the mean in Q1 2000.45 We assume uncertainty in PCE increases by an additional 0.25% per
quarter thereafter.
Shadow Values
Attribute Shadow Value Rate of Change (Quarterly)
Transfer Rate N (791.3, 207.8) N (-0.030, 0.002)
Storage Capacity N (39.0, 9.9) N (-0.056, 0.003)
File-Access Time N (49, 12.25) N (-0.01, 0.005)
(5% standard deviations assumed for rates of change)
Because our estimate is based on heuristics rather than data, we assume the file-
access-time shadow value has larger variance than the other two shadow values. We base our
assumptions about their variation on the estimated standard errors from the fitted hedonic
model. For the access-time shadow value, we assume a standard deviation equal to 25% of the
mean.
                                               
45 This is the ratio of the difference between high and low estimates—produced by respectively adding and
subtracting one standard error from the intercept and time coefficient in the fitted model—to the mean
prediction. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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Sensitivity Analysis
The tests presented in this section are divided into those affecting the innovations,
those affecting both innovations and defenders (these are taste and market parameters), and
value-of-information tests examining correlations in uncertainties.
Innovation Parameters Only
Here we ask how sensitive our results are to parameters whose values are informed by
information provided by the innovators. The parameters examined here concern performance
attributes of the innovations, along with their off-the-shelf prices initially and over time, and
rates of adoption.
Table A-4 indicates that benefits are more sensitive to assumptions about the
innovations’ price and adoption rate than to their performance.46 For the linear scanning
innovation, benefits are also somewhat sensitive to the data transfer rate assumption, because
that category provides most of its advantage over the products to which we compare it (see
appendix). For both new technologies, benefits are also a little sensitive to whether price
changes at a different rate than the defender technology prices.
                                               
46 Recall that we hold performance fixed in our model, but that lowering the price has the same effect,
mathematically, as improving performance. To be conservative, we usually assume that defender prices of the
defender technologies drop at the same rate. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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LINEAR SCANNING (median present discounted value: $2.15 billion)*
+50% $2.13 B 2.16 B 2.52 B 3.46 B 1.51 B 2.36 B 4.60 B
-50% $2.16 B 2.13 B 1.26 B 1.00 B 2.82 B 1.76 B 0.39 B
OPTICAL TAPE (median present discounted value: $1.46 billion)*
+50% $1.45 B 1.6 B 1.57 B 2.21 B 0.81 B 1.64 B 3.48 B
-50% $1.46 B 1.26 B 1.31 B 0.72 B 2.12 B 1.22 B 0.24 B
* Median values differ slightly from those in table 1 due to statistical variability
† Adoption rate, price, rate of change in price all made better (“+50%”) or worse simultaneously for
   innovation. Rates of adoption and price-decrease raised (lowered) while initial price is lowered (raised).
Prices and adoption rates are influential because total benefits equal per-unit
benefits—which depend directly on price—times total unit sales, a direct function of the
adoption rate. The adoption elasticity of benefits is slightly greater than one: unit sales vary
nonlinearly with the rate of adoption, and this just cancels the effect of declining per-unit
benefits over time.47 Benefits are somewhat less sensitive to the prices of the innovations,
because the effects of price are mediated by the quality adjustments, which are additive.
The last column of the table reports the effects of changing the adoption rates and both
types of price parameter simultaneously. On a priori grounds, we expect these variables will
be correlated: a higher price, or a slower rate of price decline, should slow a new product’s
rate of adoption. When we change all of these parameters, the effect on benefits is
considerable. A 50% deterioration in the parameters (from the point of view of the
innovation) cuts estimated benefits by more than 80%. The effect is the same for the opposite
changes. For the price parameter, we consider such large changes to be unlikely, however: a
50% increase in introductory price is far outside even the conservatively wide bounds we set
                                               
47 Per-unit benefits decline over time because consumer shadow values for quality differences decline, as
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in our model. We also expect innovation prices should drop faster, not more slowly, than
defender prices—for reasons stated elsewhere.48
Taste and Market-Size Parameters
Next, we consider the effects of parameters affecting both defender and innovation.
Here, we focus on shadow values and market size. It is particularly important that we test
shadow value sensitivities, because in the model we are applying estimates of marginal
valuations to large changes in quality. This may overstate benefits, although the bias may be
offset by the consistently conservative approach we have taken with our other parameter
assumptions.
In table A-5, only the market-size parameters have a strong effect on benefits—though
5
th-percentile forecasts are well above zero. The elasticity of benefits is roughly unity with
respect to market size because it can be factored out of the cost index, and so acts as a scaling
factor.49 For the same reason, however, the market size parameters do not affect the sign of
our benefits forecast.
                                               
48 5
th percentile benefits of the linear scanning innovation are negative (-$0.27 B; equivalent optical tape
benefits are $0.02 B)) for this simultaneous sensitivity test (not shown).
49 To see this, let F represent expression (2). Note that benefits￿ (e
F-1)*PCE; however, since F takes values
very close to zero, F»(e
F-1). The expression represented by F contains factor shares s, whose numerators are
DDS expenditures, i.e., the product of DDS market size and average DDS price. Thus, F can roughly be factored
as:




(the factoring is not exact because DDS expenditures differ slightly in the two simulation scenarios). The
average DDS price across all units sold is as influential as the market size parameter, but because it is more
accurately observed, we need not do a sensitivity analysis on it. The results would obviously be the same as for
DDS market size. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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LINEAR SCANNING (median present discounted value: $2.18 billion)*
+50% $3.27 B 2.44 B 3.47 B 2.50 B 2.16 B 2.28 B 2.52 B
-50% $1.09 B 1.94 B 1.00 B 1.58 B 2.19 B 2.06 B 1.42 B
OPTICAL TAPE (median present discounted value: $1.46 billion)*
+50% $2.19 B 1.64 B 2.31 B 1.51 B 1.58 B 1.47 B 1.62 B
-50% $0.73 B 1.30 B 0.68 B 1.40 B 1.32 B 1.45 B 1.22 B
* Median values differ slightly from those in table 1 due to statistical variability.
Interestingly, the shadow value assumptions have relatively little effect on benefits.
The reason relates to how shadow values enter the model, to value differences in quality
between products. The resulting valuations are added to the prices of the underperforming
products. These price adjustments may be small, however, compared with the price
differences themselves, and their effects certainly pale in comparison with that of changing
the numbers of units sold. In particular, the shadow value of access time, which we derived
heuristically, barely changes the benefits forecast even when we assume $5 instead of $49—
corresponding to one file request per day rather than 10 (see table A-3). Changing to the lower
value drives median benefits down only to $1.9 B and $1.4 B, respectively, for DLS and
optical.
Benefits would be more sensitive to shadow values if less uncertainty were assumed
about innovation prices. We assume the price of the optical tape innovation lies between
$38,000 and $50,000 (see appendix). At the lower end of this range, the difference between
innovation and defender prices is almost twice that at the high end, and this variability simply
dominates the quality adjustments.50
                                               
50 Benefits are, similarly, not very sensitive to our assumptions about shadow value rates of change. David Austin and Molly Macauley RFF Discussion Paper 00-13
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Other Sensitivity Tests
We test other effects of changes in our demand-growth assumptions. Lowering the
exponential rate assumed for the innovation scenario from 1.8% to 1.5%, to match the (linear)
rate in the baseline scenario, lowers forecasted benefits slightly, to $2.11 B and $1.42 B for
DLS and optical, respectively. When we assume innovation-scenario demand growth is linear
at 1.5%, estimated benefits only decline to $2.08 B and $1.40 B, respectively. Our baseline
growth assumption is conservative in light of expectations that the actual rate could be as high
as 2.5%.51 Increasing the baseline growth rate to 2.5%, and the innovation-scenario rate to
3.0% to keep their ratio constant, makes median benefits $ 2.50 B and $1.68 B, respectively—
about the same as our 75
th-percentile default forecasts.
Exploring parameter shifts that drive 5
th-percentile benefits estimates to zero, we find that
it is necessary to reduce all shadow values by 85% (DLS) to 90% (optical) to accomplish this.
If we assume that new technology prices will remain fixed for five years, while defender
prices drop as originally assumed, 5
th-percentile DLS benefits are slightly less than zero
(median $1.1 B); however, defender prices would have to drop more than twice as fast as we
assume they will to eliminate optical-tape innovation benefits.52 We expect new technology
prices will actually drop more quickly than defender prices, due to learning economies and
other sources of inexpensive cost savings that will already have been exploited in existing
products.
Finally, we find that the rate at which we assume shadow values will drop has, as
expected, little effect on forecasted benefits. Rates must be increased more than three and a
half times to drive 5
th-percentile DLS benefits to zero, and even a quadrupling does not push
5
th-percentile optical benefits to zero. This result is predictable because the shadow values
themselves turn out not to be very sensitive assumptions.
Value of Information
Aside from parameters that affect the level of benefits, we look also at the
determinants of uncertainty in our forecasts. That is, variation in which parameters is most
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highly correlated with variation in the benefits? We find that there are only two kinds of
parameters whose uncertainty is highly correlated with uncertainty in the benefits estimate.
These are the DDS market-size parameters, and their rates of change over time. Recall that
our assumptions about DDS market size are not based on direct market research, but on
responses elicited in our innovator interviews. Because we have not identified market data
with which to corroborate that information, we have assumed significant uncertainty for these
parameters. Better market-size data would produce correspondingly more precise benefits
estimates, and this analysis suggests that additional research on parameter assumptions would
most cost-effectively improve precision if expended on these two kinds of parameters.
                                                
52  With optical prices fixed, and defender prices falling as originally assumed, median forecasted benefits are
$0.95 B, or $0.57 B at the 5
th percentile.